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PARTIES

The appellant is Adrian Niculescu, represented by Mark A. Besendorfer. The
Respondents, Chrysler Credit Corporation and Chrysler Motor Corporation, are represented by
the P. Bryan Fishburn.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2A-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Whether the lower court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to any
claims dealing with negligent damage to Appellant's credit, dismissing those claims. The lower
court ruled that the applicable standard was malice, rather than negligence, because that was the
only standard under which the Appellant could recover at the time of the original filing of the
lawsuit. Appellant argued that the actions of respondents in failing to correct the credit report,
and their failure to comply with the settlement agreement, which occurred after the amendment of
the law allowing claims for negligent damage, should be considered in light of the amended law
and more liberal standard. The lower court's decision should be viewed for correctness and no
deference should be given the trial court's determination as to the applicability of the rule.
B. Whether the lower court erred in not imposing sanctions for delays and the refusal of
the respondents to comply with discovery requests. The court refused to deem requests for
4

admission admitted when no timely response was filed to such requests. The lower court's
decision should be viewed for correctness and no deference should be given the trial court's
determination as to the applicability of the rule.
C. Whether the lower court erred in finding that the Appellant failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent's actions were intentional and malicious, and
therefore actionable.
D. Whether the court erred in not granting the appellant's motion for relieffromjudgment
and not amending thefindingsand judgment. This issue is viewed against a standard of abuse of
discretion.
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1. 15U.S.C. 1681.
2. Rule 36, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
STATEMENT OF CASE
The appellant purchased a new Chrysler van from Hinckley Chrysler on the 11th day of
arch, 1987. He returned it to the dealership, prior to the first payment becoming due, claiming it
was defective. He informed Chrysler Credit that he would not pay for the vehicle because of the
problems. Chrysler Credit obtained the vehicle from the dealership, sold it, and claimed a
deficiency, although no effort was made to collect the deficiency. The credit company listed the
transaction, and reported it to all of the major credit reporting agencies, as a repossession. When
the appellant, who had previously enjoyed a good credit report, next attempted to purchase
another vehicle, he was deniedfinancingbecause of the now negative credit report.
The appellant filed suit against the dealership and Chrysler Motor Corporation in United
States District Court for Utah, alleging breach of contract and breach of warranty. That matter
was eventually settled out of court. The present action was filed against Chrysler Credit
Corporation in 1989, alleging damage to the credit of the Appellant for the false and negative
credit report under 15 U.S.C. 1681. Discovery ensued and various motions were heard.
Respondent continually delayed the matter by failing to timely respond to discovery requests.
5

Eventually, in August of 1992 a settlement was reached and signed by the parties. The essence of
the settlement was that the respondent agreed to pay a small amount of money to the appellant,
and also agreed to notify all credit reporting agencies by way of a letter and explanation of the
terms of the settlement and requesting they correct or delete the credit entry of repossession
related to the transaction.
When the appellant's efforts to obtain proof of compliance by the respondent were
unsatisfactory, he filed a motion to have the settlement vacated and re-open the case. The
respondent failed to respond, and the court granted the motion. Further discovery commenced,
including paper discovery and depositions. Among the paper discovery were requests for
admissions, which were not timely answered by the respondent. A motion to compel was granted
and the answers were belatedly received, although they amounted to general denials based upon
lack of information. A motion for further sanctions wasfiledand denied by the trial judge.
A motion for summary judgment wasfiledby the respondent. Two of the causes of action
were dismissed, and another was limited in scope, leaving one cause of action and part of another
intact, essentially requiring that, in order to prevail at trial, appellant would have to prove that the
credit report was false and that the error was intentional or malicious.
The assigned trial judge, the late Anne Stirba, was gravely ill by the time the trial was held.
Retired judge Douglas L. Cornaby was assigned to try the case, Judge Stirba having previously
denied a motion to allow the matter to be tried by a jury. In spite of the bulk of the file and the
many actions taken in the matter over the years, the judge had apparently only seen thefileshortly
before the trial date. Trial was held on the 12th and 13th of February, 2001. Five witnesses were
called and some 30 exhibits were received. The court announced itsfindingsand a proposed order
was prepared. Objections to the order werefiledand another judge, the Honorable Bruce Lubeck,
who was now assigned to the cases of Judge Stirba, ruled on the objections, denying them and
affirming the original form of the order. This appeal was taken from that order. The matter was
filed in the Utah Supreme Court and then assigned to this court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Adrian Niculescu testified that he had been born in Romania and had emigrated to this
country to escape the conditions there and partake of what this country had to offer. He and his
wife and children began to build a typical American life. He established his credit and was able to
purchase a new 1983 Chevrolet Cavalier in 1983 for approximately $13,000, which he paid off on
time in 1987. (T.R. p. 26). During this same time period he also bought on credit and paid off
another vehicle for his wife, a Nissan. (T.R. p. 27). He had other credit accounts as well, including
an account tofinancethe purchase of furniture. (T.R. p. 28). The respondent conceded that there
was no evidence that the appellant had ever been turned down for credit before the purchase in
issue here. (T.R. p. 14).
The appellant, therefore, had exemplary credit on March 11, 1987, when he purchased a
new 1987 van andfinancedthe entire purchase price through Chrysler Credit Corporation. The
contract of sale was introduce as Exhibit 16. The van was to be used to enable the Appellant to
engage in the more lucrative ski and mountain resort fares, where he could transport more
passengers and bulkier luggage, such as skis. (T.R. p. 32). It was financed through Chrysler
Credit Corporation, with a total payoff, over the life of the contract, of approximately $24,000.
The appellant started having problems with the van almost immediately. Besides problems with
the sliding door that would not close and other minor matters, the vehicle had a serious oil leak.
(T.R. p. 34, 35, Exhibit 17 and 18). However, when the van was not at the dealership being
repaired, the appellant was using the van and it was working out as he had hoped, allowing him to
bring in fares of $2000 in approximately three weeks. (T.R. p. 37). He had expenses for fuel and
fees to the cab company during this same period to time, of approximately $360, leaving him a net
earning of $1,640, or $2,186 per month. (T.R. p. 38).
Mr. Niculescu took the van to be repaired numerous times. (T.R. p. 39). After the dealer
either could not, or would not properly repair the van, the Appellant sent letters to the dealership
and the manufacturer. When he received no response or appropriate action, he returned the van to
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the dealership, with the keys, and explained to the manager that he was returning the van, as it
was defective, and he could not transport passengers in it.(T.R. p. 42).
At the same time he sent certified letters to the dealership, the manufacturer and Chrysler
Credit. In the letter he explained the reason for his action, that is, that the van was defective and
was not repaired.(T.R. p. 40). Return receipts were introduced (Exhibits 20 and 21) which Mr.
Niculescu testified were receipts from some, but not all of the letters he wrote.(T,R. p. 43, 44).
The receipts were dated as being sent March 31, 1987, some two weeks before the first payment
was due on the vehicle. Mr. Niculescu testified as to the content of the letters. He stated that he
informed the recipients of the letters that he was returning the vehicle because of the problems
with the engine oil leaking and the defective and dangerous sliding door.(T. R. p. 43). He testified
that he received no response to any of his letters, or the phone calls he made during the same
period of time.(T.R. p. 45).
In the summer of 1987 Mr. Niculescu attempted to purchase another vehicle on credit.
(T.R. p. 49). His application was denied because of a negative credit entry, that is, the credit
history showed that the transaction concerning the purchase and return of the van had been
reported by Chrysler Credit as a repossession, the most damaging credit code other than perhaps
a charge-off. (T.R. 266). Appellant submitted several documents (Exhibits 24, 25, 26 and 27)
dated variously between July and December of 1987, showing instances of denied applications for
credit, both for the purchase of vehicles, and other credit matters. (T.R. p. 55-58).
Mr. Niculescu testified that as a result of the actions of the respondent, and the subsequent
damage to his credit, he was unable to borrow money at a reasonable market rate, if at all,
sometimes paying as much as 525% interest. (T.R. p. 60). He indicated that hisfinancialsituation
snowballed, in that he could not afford to pay the exorbitant rates, further decreasing his available
income, causing him to have to live in his car, andfinally,to declare bankruptcy in 1992.(T.R. p.
61; p. 129).
The year 1992 was also the year that the appellantfinallyworked out a settlement with the
respondent. After resisting the lawsuit for three years, they agreed, by written stipulation, to pay
8

the appellant $1,500 and agreed to delete the reference to the repossession and to inform credit
agencies of the terms of the settlement. (See Exhibit 30). The salient paragraph reads:
"Chrysler Credit Corporation shall issue to the appropriate credit reporting bureau
an explanation detailing the complete satisfaction and settlement of its outstanding
credit report relative to the agreeing Niculescu, including , if possible, a retraction
of the repossession notice. Said explanation shall e in conformity with the rules and
regulations of the credit bureau."
But the respondents never complied with the settlement agreement. Not only did the
appellant have to repeatedly request proof of compliance, but when some attempt to show
compliance was made, it did not comply with the written agreement that the respondent signed.
(T.R. p. 66, 64, Exhibit 32). In fact, Judge Cornaby so found. In the partial transcript that was
prepared, only covering the court's ruling, at page 3, the court finds, with respect to the
compliance, "I don't believe that filled the requirements of that paragraph. I think that it should
have been more than that, and it should have been done immediately. When I say immediately,
about 30 days, something like that, to give the parties a chance to get notified and do what they
are supposed to do."
The appellant filed a motion to reopen the case, alleging that the respondent had no
complied with the agreement. The respondent did not respond to the motion and Judge Stirba
granted the motion. Further discovery proceeded, with the respondent repeatedly being late or
deficient in their responses. (See Exhibit, Addendum). When the appellant requested production
of documents, the respondent indicated that it had destroyed the file sometime after 1992,
thinking the matter had been resolved, even though the appellant, during the same period of time,
was requesting proof of compliancefromrespondent's counsel, as stated earlier. Chrysler Credit's
representative confirmed the destruction of the documents. (T.R. p. 179).
Several acquaintances of Mr. Niculescu were called and testified as to their observations
of hisfinancialand living conditions during the time after the report of repossession was made.
John Rhoades testified that he knew Mr. Niculescu as a cab driver, as he, Rhoades was a shuttle
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driver for the airport. (T.R. p. 135). Mr. Rhoades testified about the long hours he knew Mr.
Niculescu to work, and thefinancialrealities of the cab business, the advantage of owning your
own vehicle, and the lucrative ski resort business.(T.R. p. 138-139). Mr. Florin Preda, another cab
driver who knows Mr. Niculescu, testified similarly, as well as testifying as to Mr. Niculescu's
change infinancialand personal circumstances during the relevant time period. He testified that
Mr. Niculescu was then living as "a bum" and was actually living in his car.(T.R. p. 147). He was
also able to compare Mr. Niculescu's status before and after the summer of 1987. (T.R. 153).
Appellant also called Mr. Jon Cassel from Chrysler Credit Corporation. In 1987 Mr.
Cassel was a customer accounts manager in the Bountiful, Utah office.(T.R. p. 156). He testified
that the dealership's employees would prepare credit applications and submit them to Chrysler
Credit.(T.R. p. 158). After testifying generally about credit reporting, he testified about his
knowledge of Mr. Niculescu's case. After noting that a repossession was coded as "I 8" by credit
bureaus (T.R. p. 161), he explained that after the first payment was not made on April, 25, 1987,
a late notice would have gone out on approximately the 5th of May.(T.R. p. 163). He testified
that the vehicle apparently sat at the dealership from April 1st until approximately May 19th when
Chrysler Credit took possession of it.(T.R. p. 165). He testified that, other than bankruptcy, a
repossession was the worst entry that could be made on someone's credit history (T.R. p. 172),
and that such a notation affects someone's rating for seven years (T.R. p. 178).
Mr. Cassel also testified that normally it would take 30 to 60 days to correct the credit
history, as the settlement agreement required (T.R. p. 181) and yet he was aware that there was a
dispute regarding compliance in 1993, that he was working closely with Gary Howell (sic) on the
matter, and that no record of any attempt to correct the record was apparent until November of
'93.(T. R. p. 184). Mr. Cassel testified as to other instances of Mr. Niculescu's credit history, and
reported on credit purchases he made in later years. (T.R. p. 203). He also admitted that there
was another way of coding a transaction as a return of purchase (T.R. p. 217-218, commenting on
Trial Exhibit 10) rather than a repossession, contrary to his earlier testimony that there was no
other way to report Mr. Niculescu's return of the vehicle.
10

After initially, in discovery, denying that the respondent had any knowledge of
investigations orfindingsoffraudregarding Chrysler Motor Corporation's selling used vehicles as
new, Mr. Cassel admitted knowledge of such issues. (T.R. p. 237-238). When appellant's counsel
attempted to delve into this issue, the court would not allow it. (T.R. 239). Counsel proffered the
relevance and further proffer is contained in the Addendum. (See Exhibit C).
Arlene Bettingfield testified for the respondent. She testified that she worked in the
Bountiful office of the respondent during the relevant time period. She testified in general about
the workings of the office, having no personal knowledge of Mr. Niculescu's case. She admitted
that there was a procedure to correct a credit report within her officer and she had done so on
occasion. (T.R. p. 261).

ARGUMENT
THE DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S CAUSES OF ACTION BASED
UPON NEGLIGENT DAMAGE TO APPELLANT'S CREDIT WAS
IMPROPER.
The appellant in this matter claimed a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1681. Admittedly, at
the time of thefilingof the complaint, a violation had to be grounded on a false report that was
intentional and malicious. However, at the time of the ruling on the motion, the law had been
amended to allow claims for negligence. Since the Appellant's motion to reopen the case was
granted, and the Appellant's claims were of an ongoing nature, alleging that the respondent was
continuing to erroneously report, and failing to correct his credit history, he should have been
allowed the benefit of the new standard, at least as far as the damages occurring after the effective
date of the amendment.
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THE COURT SHOULD HAVE IMPOSED SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE
TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY AND SHOULD HAVE DEEMED
ADMITTED THE REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS,
The history of this case is replete with the inability or refusal of the respondent to comply
with discovery in a timely manner. At least three motions to compel were filed by the appellant
between 1989 and 1992 when the aborted settlement was reached. On two occasions the late
discovery consisted of requests for admissions. One set, served on respondent on May 28, 1999,
was not answered within 30 days, indeed, it was not answered until October 8, 1999, only after a
motion to compel was granted, specifically warning the respondent that failure would result in
serious sanctions, such as the striking of its pleadings.
Another set, served on January 27th, 2000, was not responded to until at least February
28th, some 32 days later, and at best the answers were incomplete or wholly deficient. The
appellant filed a motion for sanctions dated the 28th day of March, 2000. The court erred in
failing to grant the motion and to declare the admissions deemed admitted.
It is clear that requests for admissions are automatically deemed admitted if they are not
responded to in the 30 days required by Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. An
equivocal refusal to submit, even if timelyfiled,can be an admission Bair v. Axiom Design, 2001
UT 20, 20 P.3d 388, (Utah 2001). As far back as 1979, in Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah
1979) or in Whitaker v. Nikols, 699 P.2d 685 ( Utah 1985) this principle has been clear. And our
courts have recently reiterated this interpretation of the rule. In the case of In The Matter of
Pendleton, 2000 UT Adv. Rpt. 77, the Supreme Court stated: [W]e next address whether the
matters set forth in the OPCs request for admissions were properly deemed admitted. The
disciplinary court deemed the matters admitted because Pendleton failed to file a timely response
to the OPCs request for admissions. Rule 36 makes clear that "[e]ach matter of which an
admission is requested . . . is admitted" if not responded to within thirty days, Utah R. Civ. P.
36(a)(2); see also Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail Inc., , 1299-1300 (Utah 1982). In the
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instant case, Pendleton failed to timely respond to the OPC's request for admissions. Thus, the
trial court correctly concluded that the matters set forth in the OPCs request were deemed
admitted.
The court has no discretion in this interpretation. This court reviews the matter for
correctness. "We are asked to decide whether the trial court misapplied Rule 36(a) in deeming the
requests admitted. The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law, and we
review the trial court's decision for correctness." Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT Adv. Rpt. 99, 5.
Likewise, and in accord is State, In The Interest ofE.R., 2000 UTAPP 143. "Each matter
of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless,
within thirty days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court
may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the

admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter[.] Utah R - Civ - p - 3 6 ( a ) 0 ) & (2)
(emphasis added). The rule does not say the court may admit the matter - it says "[t]he matter is
admitted." Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a)(2) (emphasis added). By simple operation of Rule 36(a), parties
who ignore requests for admissions do so at their peril.
When requests for admissions are properly served, and no written answer or objection has been
submitted, the result is automatic - the requests for admissions, as a matter of law, are deemed
admitted by simple operation of the rule. See Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., , 100-01 (Utah
1985); United States v. 2204 Barbara Lane, , 129 (11th Cir. 1992); Hughes v. Bobich, , 755
(Alaska 1994); W.H. Shipman, Ltd. v. Hawaiian Holiday Macadamia Nut Co., , 1209 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1990); Peters, 709 N.E.2d at 54. See also 4A Moore's Federal Practice 36.05[4] n. 6 (2d
ed. 1985) (discussing federal rule). 11. Rule 36 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: A party
may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purpose of the pending
action only, of the truth of any matters . . . that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the
application of law to fact.
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In this case it is clear that the admissions were properly served. It is also clear that the
respondent at no time requested relief from the admissions. In Langeland v. Monarch Motors,
952 P. 2d 1058 ( Utah 1998) the court again stated that the only real issue was the preliminary
conditions stated in the rule: "Our decisions interpreting the rule have used similar language,
conditioning the trial court's discretion on the satisfaction of the rule's preliminary conditions:
Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b) provides that those matters deemed admitted are conclusively established as
true unless the trial court, on motion by the defendant, permits withdrawal or amendment of the
admissions. The trial court has the discretion to permit withdrawal or amendment of admissions
when the presentation of the merits of the action would be served and the party obtaining the
admissions fails to satisfy the court that he will be prejudiced in maintaining his action. The trial
court does not have discretion to unilaterally disregard the admissions. (Emphasis in the
original).
The sanctions should have been imposed in this matter. The admissions should have been
deemed admitted. The substance of the matters covered in the admissions would have
conclusively established liability on the part of the respondent, as they required the respondent to
admit that they had not independently verified the information about the loan, admit that they
received written notification, which they disputed at trial, admit that they did not report the report
as disputed, admit that they took no action to correct the credit history of the respondent or to
comply with the settlement agreement, admit that they took no action with respect to the credit
history of the appellant after notice and after being served with the lawsuit, and to admit that
demand had been made upon them to show proof of compliance with the agreement. Such facts,
which were disputed at trial, were material facts that, if deemed admitted, would have
conclusively established many, if not all of the facts necessary for the appellant to prevail. The
court clearly erred in denying the motion for sanctions.
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THE APPELLANT PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE THAT THE RESPONDENT' ACTION'S WERE INTENTIONAL AND
MALICIOUS
The Appellant established that the actions of the respondent were intentional and
malicious under the statute. Specifically, the appellant established that the report was false. The
evidence was largely undisputed that Mr. Niculescu experienced serious problems with the
vehicle, including, but not limited to, a major oil leak and several problems with proper closure of
the sliding side door. He filed a federal lawsuit in 1987 alleging breach of warranty that was
settled out of court.
He returned the vehicle on April 1, 1987. The first payment was not due until April 25th.
Mr. Niculescu was making money with the van. Certainly enough money to make the payments
and still make a profit. Other than the problems, there was no indication that he was otherwise
dissatisfied with his choice or purchase. And he had just been found to be creditworthy some
three weeks earlier.
It is also apparent that he notified all of the parties as to his reasons for his actions, this
putting the respondent on notice that this was not a repossession case, but a product return or
dispute based upon a warranty problem. He introduced certified mail receipts showing the notices
and testified about other letters and phone contacts. And although the respondent's witnesses
largely denied any knowledge of these contacts, it must be recalled that the parties were trying to
reconstruct the activities of something that happened almost fourteen years in the past, the delay
being largely a fault of the respondent's failure to comply with the settlement agreement entered
into in 1992 and their dilatory tactics in responding to discovery.
Likewise, it is clear that their lack of recollection or ability to recall events had much to do
with the fact that they had admittedly destroyed and purged the file, supposedly in the belief that
the case had been closed, even though Mr. Cassel testified that he had been in close contact with
Chrysler's counsel and knew that there was a dispute as to whether the respondent had complied

15

with the settlement. Indeed, most of the documents admitted as exhibits in the trial were
documents obtained and maintained by the appellant.
There was evidence that there were other ways to report this transaction under the facts
known to the respondents. See Exhibit 10, and the testimony of Arlene Bettingfield cited above.
The court must look to the entire set of facts and circumstances in analyzing whether the actions
were intentional and malicious. In Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 347, (Utah
App. 1997) the Court of Appeals stated: "Whether a person has acted with malice is a question of
fact. See West v. Thomson Newspapers, , 187-88 (Utah.Ct.App. 1992) (noting that judgment as
matter of law inappropriate where jury could find as matter of fact that people acted with malice),
vacated on other grounds, (Utah 1994). It follows that the degree of malicious behavior is also a
question of fact, reviewable for clear error."
In this case besides the facts noted above, there are numerous other matters relevant and
probative of the attitude, and therefore the malice of the respondent. The respondent did not
respond to any of the letters of Mr. Niculescu, which were sent on the 15th, 24th and 31st of
March of 1987. While the respondent faults the appellant and attempts to avoid responsibility for
the false and misleading report by pointing out that he could have contacted the credit agencies
directly and disputed the entry, nothing indicates that they informed him of this right, or even that
they stood by their report. They simply ignored him.
While they claim that there was no other way to report the transaction, they admit that
there are ways to list matters as a "product return." They admit that they have, on occasion,
amended or changed credit entries. They knew this was not a simple repossession or credit
relevant problem, but a dispute over a warranty with the manufacturer, their parent company.
They clearly had knowledge when the lawsuit wasfiled,yet they did nothing to correct the
problem. In fact, they did everything they could to thwart the efforts of Mr. Niculescu to obtain
relief. They delayed and obstructed discovery. They destroyed relevant documents, in spite of
their knowledge of the ongoing dispute.
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After three years, they entered into a settlement, which the trial court found, was never
complied with. The only evidence submitted of an attempt to comply with the salient points of the
agreement was a copy of a "bullseye" allegedly sent to someone in November 1993, some fifteen
months after the agreement was signed. This, in spite of the complaints and requests of the
appellant. This is what the trial court found totally insufficient compliance with the agreement.
They continued to obstruct and delay discovery, requiring yet more motions to compel to
gain compliance and yet providing incomplete responses. All of these facts are relevant in
interpreting whether the respondent acted with malice, as defined by the statute. And all of these
facts were established, proving malice by a preponderance of the evidence. In fact, the
respondent, being in the business, should be charged with the knowledge of the damage that
surely followed their actions.

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE
JUDGMENT AND THE OBJECTIONS TO THE ORDER

After the decision the respondent filed a proposed order. The appellantfiledobjections to
the order with specificfindingsas to suggested changes and additions to the order. The objections
werefiledtwo days before the court signed the order. The appellant filed a motion for relief from
the judgment as signed. The court, while stating that the objections were untimely, proceeded to
rule on the merits of the objections and rejected any additions proposed by the appellant. By
doing so the court ignored inconsistencies between the decision, as announced from the bench,
and the final order. Specifically, the court, among other things, refused to include the court's
announced finding that the respondent had not ever complied with the settlement agreement,
finding that the attempt to do so, some fifteen months later, was ineffective in any event. The
court further made a finding that the appellant had surely suffered damages as a result of the
failure of the respondent to live up to its agreement, and yet the court, while having ample
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evidence in the record to do so, refused to award damages for the failure of the respondent to
comply.
The court seemed to take the position that, since the appellant had opted to re-open the
case, he could not be awarded damages for the violation of the settlement agreement. But at the
very least, he proved to the satisfaction of the judge, that there were damages from August of
1992 on. Numerous examples in the testimony, as cited in the recitation of facts above, show that
the appellant was continuing to suffer the after effects of the original report after the respondent
had agreed to correct the report and delete the reference to the transaction. The respondent's own
witnesses testified that the effect of a report of repossession lasted for seven years. And although
there was testimony of thefilingof bankruptcy, the evidence was that the bankruptcy itself was a
product of the snowballing effect of the original report of repossession. Where the court orally
announced suchfindings,the court should have included such findings in its order and should
have at least awarded damages for the time between 1992 and the present which were shown to
be caused by the failure to correct the credit history, as agreed. To do otherwise was to, in effect,
allow the respondent to profit by its misdeed, suffering no consequences for their failure to
comply with the agreement and causing the appellant to undertake the difficult task of trying to
reconstruct the evidence of the case some fourteen years after the fact. Such difficulty was
apparent from the trial and fact that documents that would have been discoverable were
"destroyed" by the respondent.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Niculescu came to this country to start a better life for himself and his family. He
worked hard a menial jobs. He established his credit and had purchased several items, including
but not limited to, automobiles on credit. He had faithfully paid these items off in a timely manner.
He had an idea to improve his lot and bought a van to avail himself of additional income he could
produce with the van. When he could not get the dealership or the manufacturer to abide by their
warranty, he returned the vehicle, and in his mind, acted reasonably to inform the necessary
parties of the reasons for his actions. He informed the respondent that he would not pay for the
18

vehicle because it was defective, and that the respondent could not expect him to pay for the
vehicle which was defective. Had they informed him that they expected to be paid irregardless, at
least he could have protected himself. Instead, he was ignored and his case was treated the same
as if he was unable to pay, rather than as it should have been, as a returned, defective product. He
believed that the respondent could not finance the sale of a defective product once they were
notified of the problem.
He had the right to expect that they would at least respond to his letters and phone calls,
some of which were documented, some which were not. If in his naivete, he did not know exactly
what actions he should take, he believed that he would at least get a response. He got none. He
was ignored.
A report was made to all of the major credit agencies listing the matter as a repossession,
one of the most serious negative credit references that could be made. As unusual as the
circumstances were, the van left sitting for over a month and a half at the dealership, the van being
returned well before the first payment was due, and still no contact was made by the respondents
to enquire as to the problem. No response was made to the certified letters that were received.
Other options were available, yet none were used.
Instead the respondent resisted the lawsuit that was eventually filed. Not by vigorously
defending it, but by obstruction and delay. Still no eflFort was made to correct the problem.
Meanwhile, the damage to Mr. Niculescu continued. His once perfect credit was gone. He was
forced to sleep in his car and pay loan shark interest rates to survive, eventually resulting in his
filing bankruptcy.
Finally, five years after the fact, the respondent agreed to delete the reference to the
repossession from his credit history. And the respondent failed to comply. The suit was
re-opened. Again, the respondent obstructed and delayed. Sanctions were threatened but not
enforced. The court failed to enforce the automatic provisions of the rules. Again, the respondent
was allowed to benefit from its own failures. Documents were destroyed while the respondent
well knew that there was a dispute about the settlement.
19

The trial judge, who was admittedly new to the case and had not had a chance to fully
review thefile,failed to follow the law and award damages that were admittedly proven. The trial
judge erroneously ruled that since the appellant had chosen to re-open the entire case, rather than
sue for breach of the settlement agreement, he could not award damages for the breach as well,
even though he found there had been a breach of the agreement. He erroneously thought that
there was an issue in this trial regarding the breach of warranty.
At trial the appellant admitted clear and sometimes undisputed evidence of his damages,
from the approximately sixteen hundred dollars a month that he lost in income, the extra expenses
and loss of earnings he had because he had to lease a vehicle rather than own one, to the
extraordinary interest rates he was forced to pay as a direct result of his poor credit rating. The
court had ample evidence to award specific damages and yet failed to make such an award. And
the final order failed to include findings that were made and announced by the court. The
judgment should be overturned, and either damages ordered based upon the record, or the
appellant should be granted a new trial where the admissions submitted are deemed admitted with
the trial conducted consistent with this court's order.

DATED this

day of

, 2001.

MARK A. BESENDORFER
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to the Utah
Attorney General's Office this
day of
2000.

MARK A. BESENDORFER
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ADDENDUM
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EXHIBIT
A

GENERAL RELEASE
In consideration for the payment of One Thousand Five
Hundred and no/100 Dollars ($1,500.00) payable to Adrian
Niculescu receipt of which is acknowledged by Adrian^^culescu
(hereinafter the "Undersigned"), the Undersigned hereby
releases and forever discharges Hinckley Dodge, a Utah
corporation, Chrysler Motor Corporation and Chrysler Credit
Corporation, their agents, principals, servants, employees,
affiliates, predecessors in interest, successors in interest,
subsidiaries and parent corporations (collectively referred to
as the "Released Parties") from any and all claims, losses,
demands, damages, actions, causes of actions or suits, of
whatever kind or nature which now exist or which may hereafter
accrue because of, for, arising out of or in any way connected
with the subject or causes of action set forth in the files and
records of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, in that certain action denominated
Adrian Niculescu, Plaintiff v» Hinckley Dodge, a Utah
corporation. Chrysler Motor Corporation and Chrysler Credit
Corporation. defendantsr Civil No. 890906110CV.
This is a general and complete release of all claims
against the Released Partes and includes, but is not limited to
claims for personal injuries, property damages, claims for loss

of income, contribution, breach of contract, emotional
distress, indemnity, attorneys fees, permanent injury, cost of
litigation, loss of status, loss of credit rating, and all
other claims of any kind whatsoever.

It is also the express

intent of the Undersigned to this General Release to relieve
the Released Parties of any and all liability for indemnity
contribution of attorneys fees arising from or pertaining to
the legal action described above.

It is further understood and

agreed that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful and
disputed claim and that payment is not to be construed as an
admission of liability on the part of the released parties by
whom liability is expressly denied.

The Undersigned represents

and warrants that in entering into this release that he has had
the opportunity for independent legal advice and is not relying
upon any claims, representations or advices from any
representative of any party hereby released.
Chrysler Credit Corporation shall issue to the appropriate
credit reporting bureau an explanation detailing the complete
satisfaction and settlement of its outstanding credit report
relative to Adrian Niculescu including, if possible, a
retraction of the repossession notice.

7

Said explanation shall

c\^_<is^XJ- 2 -

be in conformity with the rules and regulations of the credit
bureau.
Dated:

August

0 1992.
i!r
Adrian Niculescu

'^h- -L V ° °

^r^X^d

STATE OF UTAH
)
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.

)

c/*The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this/^
day of August, 1992, by Adrian Niculescu.

My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC

JANET H.HANCOCK
800 Kennecott Building
Salt lake City, Utah 84133
My Commission Expires
February 3,1994

58483-1

STATE OF UTAH

-

3

-

EXHIBIT
B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ADRIAN NICULESCU,
Plaintiff,
MINUTE ENTRY
vs.
Case No. 890906110CV
Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA
HINCKLEY DODGE, a Utah
corporation; and CHRYSLER MOTOR
CORPORATION and CHRYSLER CREDIT
CORPORATION,

Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
plaintiff's "Motion for Relief," filed on April 24, 2001. On May
4, 2001, defendant filed "Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's ^Motion for Relief.'" No reply has been filed and the
matter was submitted for decision on May 15, 2001.
After reviewing the record in this matter, the Court finds
plaintiff's motion is not well taken. Specifically, paintiff fails
to cite any grounds under Rule 60(b) on which he relies.
Furthermore, the Court considered plaintiff's "Objections to
Proposed findings and Conclusions," although not timely submitted
pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), and found them to be without merit.
Accordingly, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the form
proposed by defendant (after having made the edits requested by the
Court) were entered.
Based upon the forgoing, plaintiff's Motion for Relief is
denied. , This Minute Entry constitutes the Order regarding the
matters addressed herein. No further order is required.

DATED this^22r^^y

of Ma

Y' 2001.
BY THE COURT

e^LukeJ^

mm M. STTRB.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 890906110 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated thi

day of

NAME
MARK A. BESENDORFER
ATTORNEY PLA
942 EAST 7145 SOUTH
#A-102
MIDVALE, UT 840470000
P BRYAN FISHBURN
ATTORNEY DEF
4505 SOUTH WASATCH BLVD
SUITE 215
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84124
GARY R. HOWE
ATTORNEY DEF
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
GATEWAY TOWER EAST, SUITE
900
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84133

£L

Page 1 (last)

y-
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EXHIBIT
C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OP MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION OF MISSOURI

1
2
3

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff*
V8

CHRYSLER MOTOR CORPORATION,
PRANK J. O'RBILLEY
and ALLEN P. SCUDDER,

No. 87-165 Cr (1)
St. Louis, Missouri
December 14, 1987

Defendants.

8
9

TRANSCRIPT OP PLEA OP NOLO CONTENDERE
ON BEHALF OP CHRYSLER MOTOR CORPORATION

10
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN P. MANGLE
11
APPEARANCES}
12
Por the Governmenti

Thomas E. Dittmeier, Esq.
United States Attorney
BY JAMES STEITZ, Esq.
and JAMES MARTIN, Esq.
1114 Market Street
St. Louis, Missouri

For the Defendant,
Chrysler Motor Corporation!

Thompson 6 Mitchell
By Charles A* Newman, Esq.
One Mercantile Center
St. Louis, Missouri 63101

13
14
15
16
17
18

Obermaier, Morvillo, Abramowitz
& Iason, P.C.
By Barry A. Bohrer, Esq.
1120 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036

19
20
21
Also Present!
22
23

Por Defendant
Prank J. O'Reilly!

Lewis 6 Rice
By Barry Short, Esq.
611 Olive Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63101

Por Defendant
Allen P. Scudder

Armstrong Teasdale Kramer &
Vaughn

24
25

•tfSr

1 I

By Fred Mayer, Esq.
611 Olive Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63101

2 |
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20 |
21 |

Eileen R. Groh, Official Court Reporter
1114 Market Street, St. Louis, Missouri 63101
(314) 621-0338

22
23
24
25

^r

1
2

THE COURT:

United States vs Chrysler.

Mr. James

Steitz is here for the government.

3

MR. STEITZt

4

THE COURTi

Yes, along with Mr. Martin*
Mr. James Martin.

Mr. Ankney is here with

5

someone. Okay. Nov, Mr. Newman, did you have an announcement fop

6

thi3 court?

7

MR. NEWMANi We do, your Honor. Our client, Chrysler

8

Motors Corporation, would like to withdraw its previously

9

entered plea of not guilty to the counts to the indictment and

10

enter a plea of nolo contendre or no contest.

11
12

THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Newman.

Mr. Steitz, did you havjs

an announcement for this court?

13

MR. STEITZ: Judge, traditionally, and as a matter of

14

policy, the government has always opposed such pleas of nolo

15

contendre and we will do so on this occasion.

16

government sees and realizes that this is a unique case before

17

the court and that similar pleas have been accepted in consumer

18

type cases.

19

pursuant to our policy, oppose this plea.

20

However, the

However, and nevertheless, the government will,

THE COURT: Okay. I forgot to call upon two of the mos

21

prominent members of this bar, probably since its inception.

22

Mr. Short, you don't want to be recognized, and Mr. Mayer is

23

appearing for respective clients.

24

MR. SHORT: I will rise in that fashion.

25

THE COURT:

^r

You represent who?

1

MR.

SHORT: Prank O'Reilly.

2

THE COURTj

And Mr. Scudder by Mr. Mayer.

Okay. Mr.

3

Newman, do you have some, a statement to sake with regard to

4

your presentation of this plea, sir?

5

MR. NEWMANi We do, your Honor. On behalf of our

6

client, Chrysler, we will urge that the Court accept this plea

7

for four reasons. First, by the acceptance of this plea. It irUJL

8

resolve the question of restitution, that i», compensation^ o

9

those who have been affooted by Chrysler's conduct as quickly aji

10

possible. The second reason we would urge the court accept the

11

plea is that the practice of disconnecting the odometers during

12

this quality test drive ceased at all plants in October of 1986

13

and currently Chrysler continues to operate the program but witji

14

connected odometers on all vehicles.

15

THE COURT: What was the date of the indictment?

16

MR. NEWMAN: The indictment was June 24, your Honor.

17

THE COURT: '87?

18

MR. NEWMAN: Correct.

19

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Newman.

20

MR. NEWMAN: The third reason is that specially to the

21

benefit of both the Court and the government, and also our own

22

client, that a very lengthy and expensive trial would be time

23

consuming, would be void; and, lastly, the Court has been made

24

aware and indeed the chairman of the Board of Chrysler Mr.

25

Iacooca, in fact, announced four steps for a program to aid the

W

consumers who received these vehicles which included increased
warranty coverage from five years, 50 thousand miles to 7 years\
70 thousand miles, to also extending that coverage not only in
time but to include certain major types of those vehicles that
would not be otherwise covered and also these consumers were
offered a free inspection and repair, if they brought their
vehicles in. And then, lastly, as to the very few vehicles, we
estimate there were approximately 40 that were damaged in the
course of this program over a substantial period.
The owners of those vehicles have been offered a
comparable, brand new, 1988 Chrysler, no questions asked.

So

for those four points, your Honor, we would ask that the court
accept the plea of nolo contendre which is going to be offered
by the company this morning.
THE COURT* Well, I should mention that Mr Steitz
mentioned the tradition of this U.S. Attorney1s Office and that
is, of course, in this district, I suspect, like most federal
districts across the country, and this judge, like most federal
judges, have accepted nolo pleas only under extraordinary
circumstances, and just for the record here, so that it's
perfectly clear, I want to mention that the possibility of this
plea in this case as first broached in the discussion with all
of the attorneys who are present, some, and attorneys for all of
parties some weeks ago, and I think that first time I advised
the lawyers that I needed a good deal of information before I

«>

1

would consider such a plea, and this Information would include,

2

did include, first, a review by the lawyers in my presence of

3

their view in the case and of their positions in the case and

4

the anticipated evidence on the key factual cases in dispute,

5

because, frankly, there are not a lot of questions in dispute.

6

I guess, the real thrust is the question of intent.

7

There doesn't seem to be much dispute about what happened but i|

8

any event I had an opportunity to go over those things and get

9

them from the lawyers and also to review the documents and

10

summaries which aided me in ay decision concerning this nolo

11

plea. So the pros and cons of that, this plea and in this case

12

have been thoroughly reviewed by me.

13

that was furnished and I've given a lot of consideration to thi

14

entire matter, and I'm well satisfied that a nolo contendre pie}

15

is appropriate in this case.

16

I've studied the material

There are really very few differences between the

17

effect of a guilty plea than of a nolo plea.

18

primary ones relate to the effect that the plea will have on an}

19

civil litigation which might arise from these circumstances,

20

same circumstances an in this case. As the lawyers know, of

21

course, I have the authority to order fines and restitution, bu

22

even more importantly, I will advise that I will preside over

23

the various aspects of the related federal court class action

24

suits that are scattered across the country, and I don't

25

that job lightly, and it's on,— this district especially is

60

In this case the

take

09
1
2
3
4
5
6

going to be a heavy burden because everybody knows that we're
under some pressure with the loss of two, recent loss of two
senior judges, and Judge Meredith whose not been working in
recent months, but truthfully will be soon.
But, anyway, we're pretty well inundated.

I do feel

in order to properly assure as fair a disposition as is possibl^

7

for claims for damages that have been suffered by the class

8

action, plaintiffs and consumers, that I will have to preside

9

over those cases.

10

So I agree with you, Mr. Newman, it would be a

11

totally unnecessary expenditure of moneys and time to take up

12

the parties in this court in any protracted litigation, where a

13

nolo plea gives me the same punishment alternatives as I'd have

14

had Chrysler been found guilty after a protracted trial and alsj}

15

possibly protracted appellate procedures.

16

permission of Mr. Steitz and Mr. Newman, and if you have nothing

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

So with the

else to say I'm going to proceed to ask the parties to respond
to certain questions that I deem to be pertinent here. Mr.
Steitz, did you have anything further at this point?
MR. STEITZ: No, your Honor.
THE COURTt Or Mr.Newman?
MR. NEWMANt No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So, Mr.Newman, it's my understanding that
the defendant pleads nolo contendre to each of the counts in
this indictment, is that correct?

09
1

A.

That18 correct, your Honor•

2

THE COURTi And did you bring with you a representative

3

of the company to answer questions that I night have In this

4

regard?

5

MR. NEWMAN! I did, your Honor. If I nay Identify I'd

6

introduce to the Court, Mr. Leroy Richie, who is vice-president

7

and general counsel of Chrysler Motors Corporation and who has

8

been authorized by duly enacted resolution of the company to

9

respond to the Court's inquiry.

10
11

THE COURT:

Good morning, Mr. Richie. Would you step

over to Mr. Rainey and be sworn, please.

12

LEROY C. RICHIE, SWORNi

13

QUESTIONS BY THE COURT*

14

Q.

15

make a witness out of you in that regard. And you've been

16

identified as the general counsel for Chrysler, that's correct,

17

is it?

18

A.

That is correct.

19

Q.

And on the Board of Directors of the defendant.

20

lawyer?

21

A.

I'm a lawyer.

22

Q.

Where did you go to school, Mr. Richie?

23

A.

New York City.

24

Q.

And would you represent to me that the Board of Directors

25

of Chrysler has authorized, is authorised to allow you to appeal:

Mr. Richie, you can stand right there.

I'm not going to

I'm a vice-president of the company.
You're a

09
1
here to enter this plea?
2
A.

They have.

Q.

And did they do that by a resolution?

A.

They did.

Q.

Mr. Newman, you supplied

3
4
5
—

6
MR. STEITZt Your Honor, yes.

I do have a copy of the

7
resolution.
8
THE COURTi And the paper Mr. Newman is handing to me
9
signed by G. Lee Phillip is an appropriate resolution to this
10
effect, is it?
11
A.

Yes it is.

12
THE COURTt 1*11 order this be made a part of the
13
record of this case, Mr. Raney. I don't think I'll insult the
14
defendant with the form question that should be asked, namely
15
whether you are financally able to pay a substanial fine, but I
16
sense, Mr. Newman, that they would be.
17
MR. NEWMAN: Correct, your Honor.
18
19
20
21

THE COURTt Mr. Richie, and again, you've gone over
these charges with Mr. Newman and your lawyers, I guess, a
number of times?
A.

22
23
24
25

I have.
THE COURTi May I assume you've gone over them with

your Board of Directors?
A.

Yes I have.

Q.

So that you and they are personally familiar with the

09

1
charges?
2
A.

Yes.

I'm familiar with the charges .

Q.

Now, you know* then I will go through the litany, that you

3
4
5

are entitled to counsel to represent you throughout?
A,
I know that.

6

Q.

7

guilty and to persist in this plea. You know, that?

You know, of course, that Chrysler has a right to plead

8
9

MR. NEWHANs Not guilty.
Q.

Plead not guilty. You've got the right to plead guilty,

10

too.

11

Q.

You know, that you have those rights?

12

A.

Yes, I do.

13

Q.

Okay. And you know that you have the right to a speedy and

14

public trial before a judge or jury?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And in that trial, that through the use of counsel, that

17

you have a right of confrontation, that is, to look at the

18

witnesses, to cross-examination the witnesses of the government

19

and things of that sort, do you?

20

A.

Yes, I do.

21

Q.

Do you know that the government has the burden of proof to

22

prove it's case beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you understand

23

that?

24

A.

I understand that.

25

Q.

And you have knowledge of the presumption of innocence thaj

09
1 applies to this case and to all criminal oases and it would be
2 applicable to presume that Chrysler is innocent in this case
3 until the government carries it's burden of proof beyond a
4 reasonable doubt by credible evidence to the satisfaction of thfe
5 judge and jury trying the case? You're aware of that, are you?
6 A*

I am aware of that.

7 Q.

Of course^ as in any such criminal trial, Chrysler would

8 not have to put on any testimony, any evidence, but could stand
9 or sit and remain silent with regard to it's defense?
10 A.

I understand.

11 Q.

It has offered no evidence —

any criminal defendant in a

12 criminal case is not required to offer any evidence on his own
13 or it's behalf? You're aware of that?
14 A.

I am aware of that.

15 Q.

Likewise, you have the right to subpoena witnesses who

16 might testify on your behalf and I will order that they appear
17 and testify, providing that they are available and that they
18 will furnish information on the case? You know that?
19 A.

I know that, your Honor.

20 Q.

Have any threats or promises other than the fact that

21 you're in this lawsuit, but any threats or promises of that
22 nature, of a different nature, been made to get you to plead
23 guilty or nolo contendre?
24 A.

Mo, they have not.

25 Q.

And if I accept your plea of nolo contendre, you realize

09
1
that a judgment of conviction will be entered upon that plea, d{>
2
you?
3
A.

I understand that*

Q.

Do you believe there's any understanding or has any

4
5

prediction been made concerning the sentence that I will order

6
7

other than the explaining the fine that we're going to get intoj?
A.
No.

B

Q.

9

of nolo contendre unless I'm satisfied that you fully understand

Okay. And you know that I do not have to accept your plea

10

your rights?

11

A.

I do realize that.

12

Q.

So with regard to the range of punishmentf fines,

13

restitutionf special assessments, let me just mention some

14

things and then I want, I donft want any speeches from you

15

folks, but I want your response. This matter has been discussed

16

in broad terms by the lawyers, you're aware of that?

17

A.

I am aware of that.

18

Q.

By the lawyers, I mean all of the lawyers for the

19

defendants as well as me? You know that?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Further you realize that no conclusion and no suggestion o

22

any sort was made by me as to what fine, what type of order,

23

restitution I might have?

24

A.

You realize that, Mr. Richie?

You realize that?

I do realize that.
)

25

Q.

And the reason for discussing it was that there are some

1

things that aren't totally clear with regards to the lav in thi£

2

regard.

3

A.

I do understand.

4

Q.

And in fact, I want to be —

5

that the range of fines that were discussed as conceivably be into

6

possible were from one million dollars up to $180 Billion.

7

you aware of that proposition?

8

A.

Yes, sir. Yes, your Honor.

9

Q.

By being, saying you're aware of it, ~

You understand that Mr. Richie?

I think I'm safe in saying

Ar£

I'm aware of that.
Mr. Steitz, you

10

are, you're likewise aware of this discussion?

11

A.

Yes, your Honor.

12

Q.

Do you both understand what I'll say now, that before I

13

will enter any fine in, and order such in this case, that I wiljL

14

receive briefs on that question from the lawyers, and will act

15

upon those briefs and that I will set such fine as I deem to be

16

appropriate and proper under the applicable law.

17

acceptable to you, Mr. Richie?

18

A.

That is acceptable.

19

Q.

And Mr. Newman?

20
21

Is that

MR. NBWMANs Correct, your Honor.
Q.

22

And Mr. Steitz?
MR. STEITZt Yes, your Honor.

23

Q.

So that I am covering a, that, again it's, it arises out of

24

the fact that the laws have been passed concerning fines and

25

things of that sort and some of it is untested territory* and I

1

would also say to the parties that should either of you with

2

regard to the fine question not be satisfied or not be, ay fine

3

to be appropriate or any of the punishment* you reserve your

4

rights of appeal, both parties to do that?

5

MR. NEWMANi Correct, your Honor?

6

A.

Yes.

7
8

Yes?

THE COURTt Mr. Steitz, would you just briefly outline
the evidence that you will expect to adduce at this trial.

9

MR. STEITZj Very briefly, your Honor, the government's

10

proof would show at least between 1949 and by Chrysler's own

11

admission, 1929 and October of 1986 Chrysler authorized it's

12

management all over the country and Canada to drive newly

13

manufactured Chrysler vehicles with disconnected odometers on

14

trips both to and from work and on other personal trips and

15

errands, that after these trips were made, the odometers would

16

then be reconnected and sold to unaware consumers and dealers.

17

In the event, the odometers on these vehicles were mistakenly

18

left connected and registered mileage, and then Chrysler

19

directed that these odometers be changed, proof would show tha|t

20

the reason for these acts was to avoid complaints from dealers

21

and consumers that they were purchasing vehicles with excessive

22

registered mileage and, further, your Honor, the practice, this

23

practice went on for many, many years and many, many cars were

24

involved.

25

identifable cars. However the number is at least 32,750 and

•

^

We have not yet reached an impact number of

1

after a computer analysis by all of the parties involved, we

2

feel that this number will be considerably higher*

3

evidence would show that we found that at least 44 of these cars

4

were involved in accidents while being driven in this manner anp

5

that the consumers in these situations were never apprized

6

this situation.

Further, tht

of

7

Finally* your Honor, the evidence would show that the

8

mailings and interstate wire transmissiona were used during the

9

course of these.

10
11

THE COURT: Now, you have basically tracked in a broad
sense the indictment in this case, am I right?

12

MR. STEITZt

13

THE COURTi The first count is the conspiracy count?

14

MR. STEITZt Yes, your Honor.

15

THE COURT: And the next, 16 in all, and the counts 2

16

Yes, your Honor.

through 14 are wire and mail frauds?

17

MR. STEITZt

yes, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: And the last count?

19

MR. STEITZ: 2 through 15

20

THE COURT:

—

2 through 15, wire and mail, yes. Pardon

21

me. Okay.

22

QUESTIONS BY THE COURT:

23

Q.

24

charge, the summary of the charges in this case and the Board of

25

Directors is likewise aware, is that right?

And, again, you, Mr. Richie, you're aware that that's the

^

1

A.

Yes, sir.

2

Q.

I didn't ask you, you also know, He. Richie, that I have

3

the right to order restitution in this case?

4

A.

I am aware of that, your Honor.

5

Q.

Okay* Mr. Newman and Mr. Richie, do you still desire to

6

plead nolo contendre for all of these counts on behalf of

7

Chrysler at this time?

8
9
10
11

MR. NEWMANt Yes, your Honor.
A.

Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT* Anything further, Mr. Steitz at this point

or Mr. Newman at this point.?

12

MR. STEIT2: No, sir •

13

MR. NEWMANt No, your Honor.

14

THE COURTJ All right.

I'm going to find that the pie

15

made by the defendant has been made voluntarily, that it has

16

been made knowledgably.

17

general counsel and vice-president of the defendant corporation

18

and he'8 accordingly authorized by a valid resolution to enter

19

this plea and the resolution has been made a part of the record

20

and I'll furthers find that the Board of Directors of Chrysler

21

was authorized to so direct Mr. Richie to enter such plea and

22

further find that the defendant is financially able to pay any

23

substantial fines and other charges and costs, that may be

24

imposed by this Court. And, having given due consideration to

25

the parties and the interests of plaintiff and the effective

I will also find that Mr. Richie is th

16
1

administration of it, I will accordingly enter a judgment of

2

conviction on the plea of nolo contendre. Any further

3

announcements by either of the parties before I —

4

MR* STEITZi The government does in light

5

of the action taken by the Court today and the plea by Chrysler

6

the government would move to dismiss charges against Mr. Scuddej:

7

and Mr. O'Reilly, that were filed in this matter.
THE COURT: And, Mr. Short and Mr. Mayer, you have no

8
9

objection. Mr. Scudder and Mr. O'Reilly are present in court.

10
11

MR. SHORTi

They are present, your Honor, and we, of

course, have no objection.

12

MR.

13

THE COURTs Well, I think it's an appropriate motion

14

under the circumstances and I will so order those dismissals.

15

Gentlemen, I'll order a limited type of presentence report and,

16

Mr. Newman, in due course check with Mr. Lorenz or whoever it ifc

17

to handle that for me.

16

year, Pebruary the 19th. Is this a Friday, Earl?

MAYERs

Yes, sir.

I'm going to set a sentencing date next

19

THE CLERKs

20

THE COURT* I'll set that date with the understanding

Yes, it is a Friday.

21

that it well may be adjusted, depending upon the

22

information I receive from you gentlemen, as well as the civil

23

matters that are pending, and, if you would, let's see, what's

24

today, December the 14th, within three weeks, why don't you

25

submit whatever kind of brief.

^

course of

Each of you can do concurrently

1

you don't need the others, and then I'll give you three or ao,

2

three weeks from this day; you'll each file a brief with regard

3

to the question of fines and restitution, which I don't think

4

you need to touch upon too auch but that's up to you two and

5

then I'll give you each another week thereafter to respond to

6

the other party's filing and anything else at this time.

7

MR. STEITZt Judge, just one question, would that be a

8

brief just on the fine and restitution?

9

sentencing memorandum?

10
11

THE COURT:

It's wouldn't be a

No, just on the fine and restitution, jus

on this legal question.

12

MR. NEWMAN: We have nothing else.

13

MR. STEITZ: That's all your Honor.

14

THE COURT: Okay.

15

(Court recessed.)

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

•ffr

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
the record of proceedings in the above-entitled natter.

/*-/•?- 71

R\

EXHIBIT
D

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ADRIAN NICULESCU,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 890906110CV

vs.

Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA
HINCKLEY DODGE, ez al
Defendants.

Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne
September 27, 1999

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant
LO Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
Specifically, on August 31, 1999, plaintiff filed a "Motion to
Compel" against Chrysler Credit Corporation, which was supported by
an affidavit of plaintiff's counsel. Defendant Chrysler Credit
Corporation did not oppose the motion. The motion was submitted
for decision on September 20.
There is no request for oral
argument.

l

The Court, having considered the motion, the supporting
affidavit and the good cause that has been shown, hereby grants the
morion to compel and orders defendant Chrysler Credit Corporation
to respond to plaintiff's discovery requests on or before October
8, 1999. Failure to comply with this order may result in an award
of attorneys fees and costs or the answer of this defendant to be
stricken and its default entered.
This signed minute entry constitutes the order regarding the
matters addressed herein. No further order is required.
DATED this 27th day of September, 1999.
BY THE COURT

ANNE M. STIRBA
THIRD DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:

Counsel/Pro Se Parties of Record

